Rule of Law, Socially Constructed Reasons, and Marriage Equality
A reason is “constructed” if it does not appeal to a natural or normative authority that stands apart from human action, but is instead created by contingent social forces. The idea of constructed reason coexists uneasily with the rule of law. A bedrock rule-of-law principle requires that government...
| Published in: | Journal of law, religion and state |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2018
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| In: |
Journal of law, religion and state
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| Further subjects: | B
Gadamer
Heidegger
hermeneutics
Kant
legal reasoning
natural law
Obergefell
rule of law
social construction
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| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |
| Summary: | A reason is “constructed” if it does not appeal to a natural or normative authority that stands apart from human action, but is instead created by contingent social forces. The idea of constructed reason coexists uneasily with the rule of law. A bedrock rule-of-law principle requires that government action be nonarbitrary or reasoned, “reason unaffected by desire,” as Aristotle said. Yet, if the reasons judges invoke to justify judicial decisions are part of variable social and historical contexts in which the judges themselves are embedded, how can judicial decisions uphold the rule-of-law requirement of reasoned decision making untainted by the decision maker’s desires? |
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| ISSN: | 2212-4810 |
| Contains: | In: Journal of law, religion and state
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22124810-00602001 |