Searle: significado y referencia en los discursos de la ciencia
Some names in our language are not indeed applied to anything or nobody if they are taken literally, because they lack their referent. According to Searle, names' significance does not depend on how they can give account or not of world samples; their significance "is measured" in the...
| Published in: | Veritas |
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| Authors: | ; |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
2017
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| In: |
Veritas
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| RelBib Classification: | VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
mundos posibles
B Illocutionary acts B Possible Worlds B Significatividad B Reference B actos ilocucionarios B Significance B referencia |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Some names in our language are not indeed applied to anything or nobody if they are taken literally, because they lack their referent. According to Searle, names' significance does not depend on how they can give account or not of world samples; their significance "is measured" in the use of them in this or that speech, amid explanations or characterizations forged by rules, because to speak a language it is to take active part in a complex rule-governed behavior. This article supports how in the philosophy of Searle meaningfulness of speeches, including those of science or fiction, is achieved in the issuance of illocutionary acts that make possible the invention of worlds full of meanings, even when they lack direct referent. (English) |
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| ISSN: | 0718-9273 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Veritas
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.4067/S0718-92732017000100004 |