The Dilemma of Moral Naturalism in Nagel's Mind and Cosmos
The present contribution deals with both moral naturalism in general and Nagel’s version thereof in particular. In Mind and Cosmos, Nagel offers a neo-naturalistic theory of moral values that claims the existence of irreducibly objective moral values and that excludes at the same time so-called &quo...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Peeters
[2018]
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| Dans: |
Ethical perspectives
Année: 2018, Volume: 25, Numéro: 2, Pages: 203-231 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Nagel, Thomas 1937-
/ Naturalisme éthique
/ Valeur
/ Règle de conduite
/ Nature
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| RelBib Classification: | NCA Éthique VA Philosophie |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | The present contribution deals with both moral naturalism in general and Nagel’s version thereof in particular. In Mind and Cosmos, Nagel offers a neo-naturalistic theory of moral values that claims the existence of irreducibly objective moral values and that excludes at the same time so-called "metaphysical baggage", i.e. the postulation of supposedly "queer" non-natural entities. It is this meta-ethical standpoint that I critically examine here. I begin by providing a rough outline of Nagel's meta-ethical thought. The strategy in the next part of the article is the following: I explore moral naturalism (and its variants) as an attempt to somehow integrate morality into the scientific worldview. This moral naturalism, I argue, faces a dilemma: either it overstretches the term ‘natural’, or it fails to account for a substantial element of morality, namely prescriptivity. Since Nagel does not maintain a traditional form of naturalism, but rather a non-scientific or liberal one that allows for entities and truths that cannot be explained by traditional sciences, one might hope that he is in a position to avoid this dilemma of (scientific) moral naturalism. However, I argue that this hope is illusive; Nagel's liberal naturalism does not save him from the dilemma of moral naturalism. Therefore, Nagel's moral naturalism is inconsistent. |
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| ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.25.2.3284945 |