Models of Moral Realism in Christian Ethics
In recent decades, the idea that moral facts are not discovered but constituted by some hypothetical procedure or the attitudes of rational agents has been gaining support inside and outside of religious ethics. Often referred to as constructivism, this metaethical view proposes that moral facts are...
| Published in: | Harvard theological review |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2015]
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| In: |
Harvard theological review
Year: 2015, Volume: 108, Issue: 4, Pages: 485-507 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Christian ethics
/ Moral realism
/ Constructivism (Philosophy)
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| RelBib Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In recent decades, the idea that moral facts are not discovered but constituted by some hypothetical procedure or the attitudes of rational agents has been gaining support inside and outside of religious ethics. Often referred to as constructivism, this metaethical view proposes that moral facts are constituted by the attitudes of agents, i.e., what people would agree under some rational or idealized procedures of construction, not by facts determined by independent moral reality. |
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| ISSN: | 1475-4517 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Harvard theological review
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0017816015000358 |