Models of Moral Realism in Christian Ethics

In recent decades, the idea that moral facts are not discovered but constituted by some hypothetical procedure or the attitudes of rational agents has been gaining support inside and outside of religious ethics. Often referred to as constructivism, this metaethical view proposes that moral facts are...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Jung, Kevin (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Cambridge Univ. Press [2015]
In: Harvard theological review
Jahr: 2015, Band: 108, Heft: 4, Seiten: 485-507
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Christliche Ethik / Moralischer Realismus / Konstruktivismus (Philosophie)
RelBib Classification:NCA Ethik
VA Philosophie
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In recent decades, the idea that moral facts are not discovered but constituted by some hypothetical procedure or the attitudes of rational agents has been gaining support inside and outside of religious ethics. Often referred to as constructivism, this metaethical view proposes that moral facts are constituted by the attitudes of agents, i.e., what people would agree under some rational or idealized procedures of construction, not by facts determined by independent moral reality.
ISSN:1475-4517
Enthält:Enthalten in: Harvard theological review
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S0017816015000358