Richard Kilvington and the Theory of Obligations

Kretzmann and Spade were led by Richard Kilvington’s proposed revisions to the rules of obligations in his discussion of the 47th sophism in his Sophismata to claim that the purpose of obligational disputations was the same as that of counterfactual reasoning. Angel d’Ors challenged this interpretat...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Vivarium
Main Author: Read, Stephen 1947- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Brill 2015
In: Vivarium
RelBib Classification:KAF Church history 1300-1500; late Middle Ages
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Obligations sophisms ex impossibili quodlibet Kilvington Burley
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
Volltext (Verlag)
Description
Summary:Kretzmann and Spade were led by Richard Kilvington’s proposed revisions to the rules of obligations in his discussion of the 47th sophism in his Sophismata to claim that the purpose of obligational disputations was the same as that of counterfactual reasoning. Angel d’Ors challenged this interpretation, realising that the reason for Kilvington’s revision was precisely that he found the art of obligation unsuited to the kind of reasoning that lay at the heart of the sophismatic argument. In his criticism, Kilvington focused on a technique used by Walter Burley to force a respondent to grant an arbitrary falsehood and similar to Lewis and Langford’s famous defence of ex impossibili quodlibet. Kilvington observed that just as in obligational disputation one may be obliged to grant a false proposition and deny a true one, so in counterfactual reasoning one may be obliged to doubt a proposition whose truth or falsity one knows, on pain of contradiction.
ISSN:1568-5349
Contains:In: Vivarium
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341306