Constructivism, moral realism, and the possibility of Kant's rational religion
In this article I challenge Kantian constructivism both as an interpretation of Kant's own philosophical commitments and on its own merits as a moral theory, and argue in favour of a moral realist interpretation of Kant. I do so by focusing on Kant's own religious views and the question of...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2018]
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| In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2018, Volume: 54, Issue: 4, Pages: 455-473 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804
/ Religion
/ Rationality
/ Ethics
/ Practical reason
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NCB Personal ethics VA Philosophy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In this article I challenge Kantian constructivism both as an interpretation of Kant's own philosophical commitments and on its own merits as a moral theory, and argue in favour of a moral realist interpretation of Kant. I do so by focusing on Kant's own religious views and the question of whether a Kantian moral theory can be religiously neutral. I show that constructivist readings have severe problems on both fronts, while realist readings of Kant do not. This provides strong evidence that realist forms of Kantian ethics are preferable both as readings of Kant and as approaches to moral theory. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412517000087 |