Irrational Option Exclusion
In this paper, I describe a hitherto overlooked kind of practical irrationality, which I call irrational option exclusion. An agent who suffers from this problem does not merely fail to act on her best judgement - she fails to realize that the superior action is even an option for her. I furthermore...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2018, Volume: 21, Issue: 3, Pages: 537-551 |
RelBib Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy ZD Psychology |
Further subjects: | B
Ability to do otherwise
B Moral Responsibility B Practical irrationality B Quality of will B Reasons-responsiveness |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |
Summary: | In this paper, I describe a hitherto overlooked kind of practical irrationality, which I call irrational option exclusion. An agent who suffers from this problem does not merely fail to act on her best judgement - she fails to realize that the superior action is even an option for her. I furthermore argue that this kind of irrationality is serious enough to undermine moral responsibility. I show that an agent suffering from this problem has compromised reasons-responsiveness, does not really express her will through action, and has a hard time doing otherwise; thus, from the standpoint of several popular moral responsibility theories, we ought to conclude that her responsibility is at the very least diminished. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9897-3 |