Schelling’s pantheism and the problem of evil
Any religious worldview, understood in the sense that ‘life has a purpose’, has to face the problem of evil. The problem of evil has been particularly intensively discussed in the Aristotelian-Scholastic-Christian tradition. The most popular solution has been to deny that anything truly evil actuall...
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Medienart: | Elektronisch/Druck Aufsatz |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Veröffentlicht: |
Taylor & Francis
[2017]
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In: |
International journal of philosophy and theology
Jahr: 2017, Band: 78, Heft: 4/5, Seiten: 361-372 |
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von 1775-1854
/ Pantheismus
/ Gott
/ Freiheit
/ Das Böse
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RelBib Classification: | KAH Kirchengeschichte 1648-1913; Neuzeit NBC Gotteslehre NCA Ethik VA Philosophie |
weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Pantheism
B purpose of life B problem of evil B Teleology B Schelling |
Online Zugang: |
Volltext (doi) |
Zusammenfassung: | Any religious worldview, understood in the sense that ‘life has a purpose’, has to face the problem of evil. The problem of evil has been particularly intensively discussed in the Aristotelian-Scholastic-Christian tradition. The most popular solution has been to deny that anything truly evil actually exists. It is hard to conceive why an omnipotent and perfectly good God would allow evil to appear. Yet, Western culture has been and still is full of imagery of absolute demonic evil. I suggest that this strained dialectic could be best approached by radically rethinking the nature of evil and the theological context in which it has traditionally been thought. In his middle period works, Friedrich Schelling offers a pantheistic framework which gives extensive resources for thinking about evil. Schelling’s account is well balanced and innovative at least in two respects. It does not explain away the inscrutable presence of evil, but it neither completely renounces theoretical speculation of the origin of evil. Second, Schelling’s metaphysics anticipate Nietzsche’s fundamental critique of the ‘life-denying’ character of Western metaphysics and ethics. However, while sharing much of the critical aspects of Nietzsche’s thought, unlike Nietzsche, Schelling does not end up in atheism and moral relativism. |
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ISSN: | 2169-2327 |
Enthält: | Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2017.1364663 |