Religion and the pursuit of truth
This is a new argument to the effect that religions are not truth-oriented. In other words, it is not a fundamental function of religion to represent the world accurately. I compare two hypotheses with respect to their likelihood (in A.W.F. Edwards's technical sense). The one which entails that...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2003
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| In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2003, Volume: 39, Issue: 1, Pages: 43-60 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Truth
/ Religion
|
| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| Summary: | This is a new argument to the effect that religions are not truth-oriented. In other words, it is not a fundamental function of religion to represent the world accurately. I compare two hypotheses with respect to their likelihood (in A.W.F. Edwards's technical sense). The one which entails that religion is not truth-oriented is a better explanation than its competitor for a number of empirical observations about religion. It is also at least as probable. I point out that, once one has established that religions are not truth-oriented, it is possible to argue that religions are false and it is possible to run a sound ad hominem argument against religious believers who advance religious claims. I suggest that the results are early ones and that what matters is evaluating religion in the way I illustrate in this paper. The ad hominem argument shows that the question of whether religion is truth-oriented is particularly important. |
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| ISSN: | 0034-4125 |
| Contains: | In: Religious studies
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