Action and the problem of evil
Most contemporary action theorists deny the possible existence of intentionally evil actions or diabolic agency. The reason for this is a normative interpretation of agency that appears to be motivated by action theoretic concerns, where agents are conceived as necessarily acting sub specie bonie or...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic/Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Taylor & Francis
[2015]
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| In: |
International journal of philosophy and theology
Year: 2015, Volume: 76, Issue: 4, Pages: 335-351 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Action theory
/ Evil
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| RelBib Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | Most contemporary action theorists deny the possible existence of intentionally evil actions or diabolic agency. The reason for this is a normative interpretation of agency that appears to be motivated by action theoretic concerns, where agents are conceived as necessarily acting sub specie bonie or under ‘the guise of the good’. I argue that there is nothing in human agency to motivate this view and that diabolic evil is not at odds with inherent features of our nature. |
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| ISSN: | 2169-2327 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2015.1123113 |