Punishment, Jesters and Judges: a Response to Nathan Hanna
Nathan Hanna has recently argued against a position I defend in a 2013 paper in this journal and in my 2016 book on punishment, namely that we can punish someone without intending to harm them. In this discussion note I explain why two alleged counterexamples to my view put forward by Hanna are not...
| Main Author: | |
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| Contributors: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2019]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2019, Volume: 22, Issue: 1, Pages: 3-12 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy XA Law |
| Further subjects: | B
Punishment
B H.L.A.Hart B Harm B Conceptual Analysis B Folk theories |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Summary: | Nathan Hanna has recently argued against a position I defend in a 2013 paper in this journal and in my 2016 book on punishment, namely that we can punish someone without intending to harm them. In this discussion note I explain why two alleged counterexamples to my view put forward by Hanna are not in fact counterexamples to any view I hold, produce an example which shows that, if we accept a number of Hanna's own assumptions, punishment does not require an intention to harm, and discuss whether a definition and counter-example approach is the best way to proceed in the philosophy of punishment. I conclude with a brief exegetical discussion of H.L.A Hart's Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Reference: | Kritik in "The Nature of Punishment Revisited (2020)"
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9966-7 |
