In the Beatific Vision, both Freedom and Necessity

According to Aquinas, the souls in heaven (hereafter, the blessed) are both necessitated (i.e., determined) and free in their choice to love God. But if Aquinas is right, it may seem that we cannot give an incompatibilist account of the freedom of the souls in heaven to love God. Roughly put, incomp...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:TheoLogica
Main Author: Noia, Justin (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain [2018]
In: TheoLogica
RelBib Classification:KAE Church history 900-1300; high Middle Ages
NBE Anthropology
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Free Will
B Aquinas
B Necessity
B Beatific Vision
B Incompatibilism
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
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Summary:According to Aquinas, the souls in heaven (hereafter, the blessed) are both necessitated (i.e., determined) and free in their choice to love God. But if Aquinas is right, it may seem that we cannot give an incompatibilist account of the freedom of the souls in heaven to love God. Roughly put, incompatibilism is the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. In this paper, I take inspiration from Kevin Timpe and Timothy Pawl's account of the impeccability of the blessed to argue for a more refined view of incompatibilism, consistent with some of the literature, according to which free will is compatible with a certain kind of determinism. I then modify Timpe and Pawl's account along Thomistic lines, removing a problematic character-based contingency, to argue that anyone, regardless of character, is necessitated to love God in the beatific vision - necessitated in a sense consistent with incompatibilism.
ISSN:2593-0265
Contains:Enthalten in: TheoLogica
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.14428/thl.v2i2.2113

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