Re-evaluating the hiddenness argument from above

J. L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument for atheism (2015) assumes that God's perpetual openness to a relationship with any finite person is consistent with their perpetual flourishing. However, I argue that if Aquinas-Stump's account of the nature of love is true, then any finite pe...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: Vandergriff, Kevin
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2019]
In:International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2019, Volume: 85, Issue: 2, Pages: 193-211
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Deus absconditus / God / Human being / Atheism
Further subjects:B Nonresistant Nonbelief
B Atheism
B Love
B Motivational externalism
B Hiddenness
B Aquinas-Stump
B Schellenberg
Online Access: Volltext (Resolving-System)
Description
Summary:J. L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument for atheism (2015) assumes that God's perpetual openness to a relationship with any finite person is consistent with their perpetual flourishing. However, I argue that if Aquinas-Stump's account of the nature of love is true, then any finite person flourishes the most only if they attain the greatest degree of union among God and all relevant parties. Moreover, if Humean externalism is true, then any finite person might not have their greatest attainable degree of union among God and all relevant parties, as soon as possible, unless God sacrifices some time in the union-not the whole union-with them. Accordingly, God's perpetual openness might not be consistent with the future flourishing of any finite person-from which it follows that a crucial assumption of the hiddenness argument might not be true.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-018-9676-z