Belief, credence, and faith
In this article, I argue that faith's going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith's epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2019]
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| Dans: |
Religious studies
Année: 2019, Volume: 55, Numéro: 2, Pages: 153-168 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Foi
/ Epistémè
/ Crédibilité
/ Rationalité
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion CB Spiritualité chrétienne |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | In this article, I argue that faith's going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith's epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically rational. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412518000446 |