Ratnakīrti and the Extent of Inner Space: an Essay on Yogācāra and the Threat of Genuine Solipsism
Though perhaps a dubious honor, Dharmakīrti (fl. c. 550-650 C.E.) is the first philosopher in any tradition to explicitly recognize the epistemological threat of solipsism, devoting an entire essay to the problem-The Justification of (the very idea of) Other Minds (Santānāntarasiddhi). This essay re...
| Publié dans: | Sophia |
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| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Netherlands
[2019]
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| Dans: |
Sophia
Année: 2019, Volume: 58, Numéro: 1, Pages: 61-83 |
| RelBib Classification: | BL Bouddhisme TF Haut Moyen Âge VB Herméneutique; philosophie ZD Psychologie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Ratnakīrti
B Epistemology B First-person B Other beings B Idealism B Mind B other minds B Solipsism B Xuanzang B Yogācāra B Dharmakīrti |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Résumé: | Though perhaps a dubious honor, Dharmakīrti (fl. c. 550-650 C.E.) is the first philosopher in any tradition to explicitly recognize the epistemological threat of solipsism, devoting an entire essay to the problem-The Justification of (the very idea of) Other Minds (Santānāntarasiddhi). This essay revisits Ratnakīrti's (990-1050 C.E.) Doing Away with (A Justification of) Other Beings (Santānāntaraduṣaṇa) as a diagnosis of Dharmakīrti's attempt to reconstruct the very idea of other beings, with particular attention to Ratnakīrti's sensitivity to the conceptual preconditions for a genuine threat of solipsism. Along with the diagnosis of the conditions for the emergence of a problem of genuine solipsism, this essay takes as its focus Ratnakīrti's criticism of attempts to meet with the problem. In particular, I shall stress an insight Ratnakīrti adduces in the course of his diagnosis. Attempts to meet the problem of solipsism head on, Ratnakīrti shows us, obscure what the preconditions for a genuine problem reveal: the fact of our possessing two incommensurable conceptions of mind, one of which is intrinsically and entirely first-personal-in a sense to be clarified in the course of this essay-and the other not. I conclude this essay with an inconclusive sketch of the difficulties that remain when considering what Ratnakīrti would have us conclude from his own diagnosis. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Référence: | Kritik in "I Take Refuge in the Sangha. But how? The Puzzle of Intersubjectivity in Buddhist Philosophy Comments on Tzohar, Prueitt, and Kachru (2019)"
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-019-0707-8 |