The performative speech act in Jewish law: interpersonal vs. human-divine speech
This article investigates the binding power of the spoken word in interpersonal relationships and compares it to that in the human-divine relationship, according to Jewish law. I focus in particular on the area of proprietary rights. Does the spoken word have any binding authority in halakhah ? Can...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
College
[2015]
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| In: |
Hebrew Union College annual / Jewish Institute of Religion
Year: 2013, Volume: 84/85, Pages: 173-206 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Performative utterance
/ Speech act
/ Jewish law
/ Interpersonal relationship
/ Human being
/ God
/ Relationship
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| RelBib Classification: | BH Judaism |
| Parallel Edition: | Electronic
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| Summary: | This article investigates the binding power of the spoken word in interpersonal relationships and compares it to that in the human-divine relationship, according to Jewish law. I focus in particular on the area of proprietary rights. Does the spoken word have any binding authority in halakhah ? Can it create an actual contract between persons or between a person and God? Using the linguistic philosophy of John Austin, I will show that, while in contemporary Israeli law the spoken word indeed creates a new legal status, it has no such binding authority in traditional Jewish law in the area of interpersonal relationships. One must perform a physical deed such as moving or lifting the object in order to create a commitment. But in the area of the human-divine relationship, the spoken word has tremendous significance, to the extent that we may define it, with Austin, as a performative speech-act. By way of example I shall examine the concept of hekdesh , dedication of an object to the Sanctuary. In order to explain the difference between the two categories, I appeal to the idealistic philosophy of Fichte, who posited two concepts of the “Self”: the realistic Self and the idealistic one. I maintain that the dichotomy of the performative speech-act in Jewish law can be understood to follow this distinction. |
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| ISSN: | 0360-9049 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, Hebrew Union College annual / Jewish Institute of Religion
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