Epistemic Angst, Intellectual Courage and Radical Scepticism
The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not,...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
[2019]
|
In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2019, Volume: 9, Issue: 3, Pages: 206-222 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Pritchard, Duncan 1974-, Epistemic angst
/ Knowledge acquisition
/ Scepticism
|
RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VA Philosophy |
Further subjects: | B
intellectual courage
B Kierkegaard B Reasons Identity Thesis B epistemic angst B Cartesian picture B radical skepticism |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not, as potential knowers, just passive recipients of a passing show of putatively veridical information, we also actively need to put ourselves in the way of it by learning to resist certain forms of epistemic temptation: the Cartesian thought that we could be ‘imprisoned' within our own representations, and, hence permanently ‘out of touch' with an ‘external' world, and the Reasons Identity Thesis, which has us believe that whether we are in the good case or in the bad case, our epistemic grounds are the same. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191388 |