Why Not Persuade the Skeptic?: A Critique of Unambitious Epistemology
What constitutes a solution to the problem of skepticism? It has been traditionally held that one must produce an argument that would rationally persuade skeptical philosophers that they are mistaken. But there is a trend in recent epistemology toward the idea that we can solve the problem without g...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[2019]
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2019, Band: 9, Heft: 4, Seiten: 314-338 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Erkenntnistheorie
/ Skeptizismus
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus VA Philosophie |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Neo-Mooreanism
B Meta-epistemology B Nozick B Pyrrhonism B Skepticism B Persuasion |
| Online-Zugang: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Zusammenfassung: | What constitutes a solution to the problem of skepticism? It has been traditionally held that one must produce an argument that would rationally persuade skeptical philosophers that they are mistaken. But there is a trend in recent epistemology toward the idea that we can solve the problem without giving skeptics any good reason to change their minds. This is what I call unambitious epistemology. This paper is a critique of that project. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191366 |
