A Hume-Inspired Argument against Reason
In the \"diminution argument,\" which Hume adduces in the Treatise section \"Scepticism with Regard to Reason,\" he infers from our universal fallibility that \"all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.\&quo...
| Published in: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
[2019]
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Hume, David 1711-1776, A treatise of human nature
/ Faith
/ Reason
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Epistemology
B Hume B Reason B Scepticism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In the \"diminution argument,\" which Hume adduces in the Treatise section \"Scepticism with Regard to Reason,\" he infers from our universal fallibility that \"all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.\" My aim in this paper is, first, to show that on all extant interpretations of the argument, it turns out to be very weak, and, second, that there is in the vicinity a significant sceptical argument in support of the conclusion that all our beliefs are totally unjustified, an argument that cannot be easily dismissed. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20181321 |