A Hume-Inspired Argument against Reason
In the \"diminution argument,\" which Hume adduces in the Treatise section \"Scepticism with Regard to Reason,\" he infers from our universal fallibility that \"all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.\&quo...
| Veröffentlicht in: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Brill
[2019]
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2019, Band: 9, Heft: 1, Seiten: 1-20 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Hume, David 1711-1776, A treatise of human nature
/ Glaube
/ Vernunft
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus VA Philosophie |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Epistemology
B Hume B Reason B Scepticism |
| Online Zugang: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Zusammenfassung: | In the \"diminution argument,\" which Hume adduces in the Treatise section \"Scepticism with Regard to Reason,\" he infers from our universal fallibility that \"all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.\" My aim in this paper is, first, to show that on all extant interpretations of the argument, it turns out to be very weak, and, second, that there is in the vicinity a significant sceptical argument in support of the conclusion that all our beliefs are totally unjustified, an argument that cannot be easily dismissed. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20181321 |