No Hope in the Dark: Problems for four-dimensionalism

Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief. Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persis...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Loose, Jonathan (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2019]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2019, Band: 11, Heft: 3, Seiten: 31-47
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Hudson, Hud 1964- / Auferstehung Jesu / Dimension 4 / Hoffnung / Zukunft
RelBib Classification:AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus
AG Religiöses Leben; materielle Religion
CB Christliche Existenz; Spiritualität
weitere Schlagwörter:B Four-dimensionalism
B philosophy of religion
B Analytic Theology
B van Inwagen
B Life after death
B Metaphysics
B Hud Hudson
B Survival
B Materialism
B Personal Identity
B Persistence
B Resurrection
B temporal parts
B Physicalism
B Philosophy of Mind
B David Lewis
B Hope
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Zusammenfassung:Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief. Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persistent difficulties experienced by three-dimensionalist animalism. I present two difficulties unique to Hudson's view. The first problem of counterpart hope is a manifestation of a general weakness of four-dimensional views to accommodate adequately prudential concern about one's future self. More significantly, the second problem of quasi hope demonstrates that even if a temporal parts view can accommodate the possibility of future resurrection it necessarily leaves human beings in the dark about their individual futures and thus incapable of hope. I conclude that whatever its merits in demonstrating the possibility of resurrection, four-dimensionalist materialism cannot accommodate veridical Christian hope.
Enthält:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v11i3.2958