No Hope in the Dark: Problems for four-dimensionalism

Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief. Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persis...

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Auteur principal: Loose, Jonathan (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2019]
Dans: European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2019, Volume: 11, Numéro: 3, Pages: 31-47
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Hudson, Hud 1964- / Résurrection de Jésus / Quatrième dimension / Espérance / Futur
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophie de la religion
AG Vie religieuse
CB Spiritualité chrétienne
Sujets non-standardisés:B Four-dimensionalism
B philosophy of religion
B Analytic Theology
B van Inwagen
B Life after death
B Metaphysics
B Hud Hudson
B Survival
B Materialism
B Personal Identity
B Persistence
B Philosophie de l'esprit
B Resurrection
B temporal parts
B Physicalism
B David Lewis
B Hope
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Résumé:Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief. Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persistent difficulties experienced by three-dimensionalist animalism. I present two difficulties unique to Hudson's view. The first problem of counterpart hope is a manifestation of a general weakness of four-dimensional views to accommodate adequately prudential concern about one's future self. More significantly, the second problem of quasi hope demonstrates that even if a temporal parts view can accommodate the possibility of future resurrection it necessarily leaves human beings in the dark about their individual futures and thus incapable of hope. I conclude that whatever its merits in demonstrating the possibility of resurrection, four-dimensionalist materialism cannot accommodate veridical Christian hope.
Contient:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v11i3.2958