Hope and Necessity
In this paper I offer a comparative evaluation of two types of "fundamental hope", drawn from the writing of Rebecca Solnit and Rowan Williams respectively. Arguments can be found in both, I argue, for the foundations of a dispositional existential hope. Examining and comparing the differe...
| Published in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2019]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Solnit, Rebecca 1961-
/ Williams, Rowan 1950-
/ Hope
/ Necessity
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism AG Religious life; material religion CB Christian life; spirituality |
| Further subjects: | B
Emmanuel Levinas
B Fundamental Hope B Rowan Williams B Hope B Rebecca Solnit |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (KW) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In this paper I offer a comparative evaluation of two types of "fundamental hope", drawn from the writing of Rebecca Solnit and Rowan Williams respectively. Arguments can be found in both, I argue, for the foundations of a dispositional existential hope. Examining and comparing the differences between these accounts, I focus on the consequences implied for hope's freedom and stability. I focus specifically on how these two accounts differ in their claims about the relationship between hope and (two types of) necessity. I argue that both Solnit and Williams base their claims for warranted fundamental hope on a sense of how reality is structured, taking this structure to provide grounds for a basic existential orientation that absolute despair is never the final word. For Solnit this structure is one of unpredictability; for Williams it is one of excess. While this investigation finds both accounts of fundamental hope to be plausible and insightful, I argue that Williams's account is ultimately more satisfying on the grounds that it offers a realistic way of thinking about a hope necessitated by what it is responsive to, and more substantial in responding to what is necessary. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v11i3.2881 |