Hope and Necessity
In this paper I offer a comparative evaluation of two types of "fundamental hope", drawn from the writing of Rebecca Solnit and Rowan Williams respectively. Arguments can be found in both, I argue, for the foundations of a dispositional existential hope. Examining and comparing the differe...
| Veröffentlicht in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2019]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2019, Band: 11, Heft: 3, Seiten: 49-73 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Solnit, Rebecca 1961-
/ Williams, Rowan 1950-
/ Hoffnung
/ Notwendigkeit
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus AG Religiöses Leben; materielle Religion CB Christliche Existenz; Spiritualität |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Emmanuel Levinas
B Fundamental Hope B Rowan Williams B Hope B Rebecca Solnit |
| Online Zugang: |
Volltext (KW) Volltext (doi) |
| Zusammenfassung: | In this paper I offer a comparative evaluation of two types of "fundamental hope", drawn from the writing of Rebecca Solnit and Rowan Williams respectively. Arguments can be found in both, I argue, for the foundations of a dispositional existential hope. Examining and comparing the differences between these accounts, I focus on the consequences implied for hope's freedom and stability. I focus specifically on how these two accounts differ in their claims about the relationship between hope and (two types of) necessity. I argue that both Solnit and Williams base their claims for warranted fundamental hope on a sense of how reality is structured, taking this structure to provide grounds for a basic existential orientation that absolute despair is never the final word. For Solnit this structure is one of unpredictability; for Williams it is one of excess. While this investigation finds both accounts of fundamental hope to be plausible and insightful, I argue that Williams's account is ultimately more satisfying on the grounds that it offers a realistic way of thinking about a hope necessitated by what it is responsive to, and more substantial in responding to what is necessary. |
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| Enthält: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v11i3.2881 |