Transcendence in Postmetaphysical Thinking: Habermas's God

Habermas emphasizes the importance for critical thinking of ideas of truth and moral validity that are at once context-transcending and immanent to human practices. in a recent review, Peter Dews queries his distinction between metaphysically construed transcendence and transcendence from within, as...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: Cooke, Maeve 1959- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2019]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Habermas, Jürgen 1929- / Transcendence / Metaphysical criticism / God / Habermas, Jürgen 1929-, Nachmetaphysisches Denken
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Institutionalized Authority
B Transcendence
B Habermas
B Postmetaphysical Thinking
B Ethical truth
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
Volltext (KW)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:Habermas emphasizes the importance for critical thinking of ideas of truth and moral validity that are at once context-transcending and immanent to human practices. in a recent review, Peter Dews queries his distinction between metaphysically construed transcendence and transcendence from within, asking provocatively in what sense Habermas does not believe in God. I answer that his conception of "God" is resolutely postmetaphysical, a god that is constructed by way of human linguistic practices. I then give three reasons for why it should not be embraced by contemporary critical social theory. First, in the domain of practical reason, this conception of transcendence excludes by fiat any "Other" to communicative reason, blocking possibilities for mutual learning. Second, due to the same exclusion, it risks reproducing an undesirable social order. Third, it is inadequate for the purposes of a critical theory of social institutions.
Contains:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v11i4.2685