Transcendence in Postmetaphysical Thinking: Habermas's God
Habermas emphasizes the importance for critical thinking of ideas of truth and moral validity that are at once context-transcending and immanent to human practices. in a recent review, Peter Dews queries his distinction between metaphysically construed transcendence and transcendence from within, as...
| Veröffentlicht in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2019]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Habermas, Jürgen 1929-
/ Transzendenz
/ Metaphysikkritik
/ Gott
/ Habermas, Jürgen 1929-, Nachmetaphysisches Denken
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus VA Philosophie |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Institutionalized Authority
B Transcendence B Habermas B Postmetaphysical Thinking B Ethical truth |
| Online Zugang: |
Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang Volltext (KW) Volltext (doi) |
| Zusammenfassung: | Habermas emphasizes the importance for critical thinking of ideas of truth and moral validity that are at once context-transcending and immanent to human practices. in a recent review, Peter Dews queries his distinction between metaphysically construed transcendence and transcendence from within, asking provocatively in what sense Habermas does not believe in God. I answer that his conception of "God" is resolutely postmetaphysical, a god that is constructed by way of human linguistic practices. I then give three reasons for why it should not be embraced by contemporary critical social theory. First, in the domain of practical reason, this conception of transcendence excludes by fiat any "Other" to communicative reason, blocking possibilities for mutual learning. Second, due to the same exclusion, it risks reproducing an undesirable social order. Third, it is inadequate for the purposes of a critical theory of social institutions. |
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| Enthält: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v11i4.2685 |