DeRose on Lotteries
This article discusses Keith DeRose's treatment of the lottery problem in Chapter 5 of his recent The Appearance of Ignorance. I agree with a lot of it but also raise some critical points and questions and make some friendly proposals. I discuss different ways to set up the problem, go into the...
Main Author: | |
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Contributors: | |
Format: | Electronic Review |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
[2020]
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2020, Volume: 10, Issue: 1, Pages: 44-67 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Epistemological contextualism
/ Lottery
/ Proposition
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VA Philosophy |
Further subjects: | B
ending inquiry
B Book review B epistemic lotteries B lottery problem B Skepticism B Knowledge B DeRose |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | This article discusses Keith DeRose's treatment of the lottery problem in Chapter 5 of his recent The Appearance of Ignorance. I agree with a lot of it but also raise some critical points and questions and make some friendly proposals. I discuss different ways to set up the problem, go into the difference (quite relevant here) between knowing and ending inquiry, propose to distinguish between two different kinds of lotteries, add to the defense of the idea that one can know lottery propositions, give a critical discussion of DeRose's contextualist solution to the problem, and support his defense against an absurdity objection with additional arguments. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Reference: | Kritik in "Replies to Commentators (2020)"
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Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191369 |