Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and Pragmatics
In this paper, I offer a novel defense of moderate pessimism about moral deference, i.e., the view that we have pro tanto reason to avoid moral deference. I argue that moral deference fails to give us the epistemic credentials to satisfy plausible norms of moral assertion. I then argue that moral as...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2020]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2020, Volume: 23, Issue: 1, Pages: 5-22 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCA Ethics VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Moral deference
B Moral testimony B Moral assertion B moral epistemology B Pragmatics |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |