What If God Makes Hard Choices?
Chapter 2 explores the implications for classical theism of the possibility that God makes "hard choices." A choice between two actions is hard if the chooser believes that each action is better than the other in some respects, but believes neither that one action is better overall than th...
| Published in: | Oxford studies in philosophy of religion |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University Press
[2019]
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| In: |
Oxford studies in philosophy of religion
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Omniscience
/ Freedom of choice
/ Choice of
/ Consideration
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| Summary: | Chapter 2 explores the implications for classical theism of the possibility that God makes "hard choices." A choice between two actions is hard if the chooser believes that each action is better than the other in some respects, but believes neither that one action is better overall than the other nor that the two actions are equally valuable overall. Even an omniscient God might be forced to make hard choices if, as seems plausible, "better than," "worse than," and "equal in value to" do not exhaust the relevant value relations that one action can bear to another. This chapter seeks to show that, if God does make hard choices of a certain sort, then God can be essentially perfectly rational and still have morally significant freedom. This is important because maximal praiseworthiness both requires morally significant freedom and, like perfect rationality, is required for divinity in the classical sense. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Oxford studies in philosophy of religion
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