Venkatapuram's Capability theory of Health: A Critical Discussion
The discussion about theories of health has recently had an important new input through the work of Sridhar Venkatapuram. He proposes a combination of Lennart Nordenfelt's holistic theory of health and Martha Nussbaum's version of the capability approach. The aim of the present article is...
| Published in: | Bioethics |
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| Main Author: | |
| Contributors: | |
| Format: | Electronic Review |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2016]
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| In: |
Bioethics
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| Review of: | Health justice (Cambridge : Polity, 2011) (Tengland, Per-Anders)
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| RelBib Classification: | NCH Medical ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Ability
B Book review B Health B Capabilities B Nordenfelt B Venkatapuram B subjective wellbeing B capabilties approach |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | The discussion about theories of health has recently had an important new input through the work of Sridhar Venkatapuram. He proposes a combination of Lennart Nordenfelt's holistic theory of health and Martha Nussbaum's version of the capability approach. The aim of the present article is to discuss and evaluate this proposal. The article starts with a discussion of Nordenfelt's theory and evaluates Venkatapuram’ critique of it, that is, of its relativism, both regarding goals and environment, and of the subjectivist theory of happiness used. Then the article explains why Nordenfelt's idea of a reasonable environment is not a problem for the theory, and it critiques Venkatapuram's own incorporation of the environment into the concept of health, suggesting that this makes the concept too wide. It contends, moreover, that Venkatapuram's alternative theory retains a problem inherent in Nordenfelt's theory, namely, that health is conceived of as a second-order ability. It is argued that health should, instead, be defined as first-order abilities. This means that health cannot be seen as a capability, and also that health cannot be seen as a meta-capability of the kind envisioned by Venkatapuram. It is, furthermore, argued that the theory lacks one crucial aspect of health, namely, subjective wellbeing. Finally, the article tries to illustrate how health, in the suggested alternative sense, as first-order abilities, fits into Nussbaum's capability theory, since health as an ‘actuality’ is part of all the ‘combined capabilities’ suggested by Nussbaum. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Reference: | Kritik in "On Health Justice. Some Thoughts and Responses to Critics (2016)"
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12223 |