A Dilemma for Driver on Virtues of Ignorance
For Julia Driver, some virtues involve ignorance. Modesty, for example, is a disposition to underestimate self-worth, and blind charity is a disposition not to see others’ defects. Such “virtues of ignorance,” she argues, serve as counterexamples to the Aristotelian view that virtue requires intelle...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2020]
|
| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2020, Volume: 23, Issue: 5, Pages: 889-898 |
| RelBib Classification: | NBE Anthropology NCA Ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Aristotelian virtue theory
B Julia Driver B Virtue B Ignorance B Virtues of ignorance |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Summary: | For Julia Driver, some virtues involve ignorance. Modesty, for example, is a disposition to underestimate self-worth, and blind charity is a disposition not to see others’ defects. Such “virtues of ignorance,” she argues, serve as counterexamples to the Aristotelian view that virtue requires intellectual excellence. But Driver seems to face a dilemma: if virtues of ignorance involve ignorance of valuable knowledge, then they do not merit virtue status; but if they involve ignorance of trivial knowledge, then they do not preclude intellectual excellence. So, either there are no virtues of ignorance, or there are no virtues of ignorance - at least not the sort of ignorance that precludes intellectual excellence. Virtues of ignorance therefore fail as counterexamples to Aristotelian virtue theory. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-020-10110-2 |
