Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism

Abstract A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focuses on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlying concern is that if moral truths have the nature that realists believe, it is hard to see how we could know what they are. This objection may be called the “argument from...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal for the study of skepticism
Authors: Risberg, Olle (Author) ; Tersman, Folke 1964- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2020
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Moral realism / Scepticism
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Moral Realism
B Moral anti-realism
B Moral Disagreement
B Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
B moral skepticism
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Description
Summary:Abstract A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focuses on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlying concern is that if moral truths have the nature that realists believe, it is hard to see how we could know what they are. This objection may be called the “argument from skepticism” against moral realism. Realists have primarily responded to this argument by presenting accounts of how we could acquire knowledge of moral truths that are consistent with realist assumptions about their nature. Less time has been spent, however, on the question of why it would be a problem for moral realism if it leads to skepticism in the first place, and on the related question of which skeptical conclusions it would be problematic for realists to simply accept. This paper considers several answers to these questions, thereby distinguishing a number of versions of the argument from skepticism, and discusses their prospects.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10017