Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?
Abstract Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophe...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2020
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| Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2020, Volume: 10, Numéro: 3/4, Pages: 325-345 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Philosophe
/ Foi philosophique
/ Expert
/ Rejet
/ Irrationalité
|
| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
epistemology of philosophy
B Disagreement B Skepticism B Controversy B Metaphilosophy B Expertise |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (Verlag) |