Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?
Abstract Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophe...
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Brill
2020
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2020, Band: 10, Heft: 3/4, Seiten: 325-345 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Philosopher
/ Philosophical faith
/ Expert
/ Rejection of
/ Irrationality
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus VA Philosophie |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
epistemology of philosophy
B Disagreement B Skepticism B Controversy B Metaphilosophy B Expertise |
| Online Zugang: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (Verlag) |
| Zusammenfassung: | Abstract Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophers are aware that they are not God’s gift to philosophy, since they admit their ability to track truth in philosophy is not extraordinary compared to that of other philosophers. In this paper I argue that in many real-life cases, such beliefs in controversial claims are irrational. This means that most philosophers have irrational philosophical beliefs. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10015 |