On the Underpinning Mechanisms of (Epistemically) Reliable Processes
Abstract The paper aims to evaluate the success of two different philosophical interpretations of prediction error minimisation theory in dissolving a notorious problem of philosophy, i.e., the New Evil Demon Problem ( ned ). In this paper, I argue that the inferentialist interpretation could not di...
| Published in: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2021
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Cartesianism
/ Cognition theory
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
predictive coding
B New Evil Demon Problem B Reliabilism B Representationalism |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (Verlag) |
| Summary: | Abstract The paper aims to evaluate the success of two different philosophical interpretations of prediction error minimisation theory in dissolving a notorious problem of philosophy, i.e., the New Evil Demon Problem ( ned ). In this paper, I argue that the inferentialist interpretation could not dissolve the strong form of ned . Alternatively, the embodied construaldissolves ned . However, in doing so, i.e., in dispensing with the cognitive judgment, the embodied construal might also eliminate some basic concepts of epistemology. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191372 |