Immediacy in Aristotle’s Epistemology
Abstract This article discusses immediate premises in Aristotle’s epistemology. The traditional interpretation identifies immediacy with indemonstrability: immediate truths are the indemonstrable principles of science from which the theorems are derived by demonstration. Against this common reading,...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2021
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| In: |
Phronesis
Year: 2021, Volume: 66, Issue: 2, Pages: 111-138 |
| Further subjects: | B
Immediacy
B Explanation B Justification B Demonstration B Aristotle |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Abstract This article discusses immediate premises in Aristotle’s epistemology. The traditional interpretation identifies immediacy with indemonstrability: immediate truths are the indemonstrable principles of science from which the theorems are derived by demonstration. Against this common reading, I argue that Aristotle’s recognition of two kinds of epistemic priority (priority by nature and priority to us) commits him to the existence of two types of immediacy, only one of which is equivalent to indemonstrability. As a result, my interpretation offers a better understanding of a puzzling passage ( APo . 1.13, 78a22–b4) that seems to contradict the standard view. |
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| ISSN: | 1568-5284 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Phronesis
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685284-BJA10036 |