“For I Say”: A Keeper at the Rabbinic Gates of Doubt
Abstract The rabbinic idiom “for I say” ( שאני אומר ) has been construed philologically as a specific type of presumption, buttressed with first-person rhetoric. From the perspective of legal analysis, I contend that “for I say” and presumption are diametrically opposed decision-rules, employed cons...
| Published in: | The review of rabbinic Judaism |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2021
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| In: |
The review of rabbinic Judaism
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| Further subjects: | B
Jewish law and jurisprudence
B factual uncertainty B legal fictions B Narrative B talmudic law |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Abstract The rabbinic idiom “for I say” ( שאני אומר ) has been construed philologically as a specific type of presumption, buttressed with first-person rhetoric. From the perspective of legal analysis, I contend that “for I say” and presumption are diametrically opposed decision-rules, employed consistently in tannaitic and amoraic literature. While presumptions are exclusionary rules, circumscribing doubt, “for I say” is an inclusionary rule, validating doubt. The versatility of the “for I say” rule testifies to its preliminary nature – while the outcome is determined by a robust set of primary decision rules. “For I say” should be read as: for I can say, legitimizing doubt and calling on primary rabbinic rules for treating cases of factual uncertainty, in contestable instances. |
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| ISSN: | 1570-0704 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: The review of rabbinic Judaism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15700704-12341375 |