Theistic Moral Realism, Evolutionary Debunking Arguments, and a Catholic Philosophy of Nature

Evolutionary debunking arguments, whether defended by Street (2006), Joyce (2006), or others against moral realism, or by Plantinga (1993, 2011) and others against atheism, seek to determine the implications of the still-dominant worldview of naturalism. Examining these arguments is thus a critical...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Rauschenbach, Michael (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: 2019
In: Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
Year: 2019, Volume: 93, Pages: 177-188
RelBib Classification:CF Christianity and Science
KDB Roman Catholic Church
VA Philosophy
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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