A Sellarsian Transcendental Argument against External World Skepticism
Abstract This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be fo...
Published in: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Published: |
Brill
2021
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2021, Volume: 11, Issue: 3, Pages: 193-223 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Sellars, Wilfrid 1912-1989
/ Transzendentales Argument
/ Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804
/ Scepticism
/ Cartesianism
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VA Philosophy |
Further subjects: | B
Cartesian skepticism
B Wilfrid Sellars B transcendental arguments B Kantian skepticism B Rule-following B meaning skepticism |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Abstract This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be found in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. It is then argued that, on the basis of that very same solution to the Kantian problematic of rule-following and meaning, a novel argument against external world skepticism can be formulated. This argument takes the shape of a transcendental argument, which is reminiscent of Hilary Putnam’s infamous argument against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, but is, as is argued, superior to it in certain respects. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20201365 |