A Sellarsian Transcendental Argument against External World Skepticism

Abstract This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be fo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal for the study of skepticism
Main Author: Geier, Marin (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2021
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Sellars, Wilfrid 1912-1989 / Transzendentales Argument / Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804 / Scepticism / Cartesianism
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Cartesian skepticism
B Wilfrid Sellars
B transcendental arguments
B Kantian skepticism
B Rule-following
B meaning skepticism
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Summary:Abstract This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be found in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. It is then argued that, on the basis of that very same solution to the Kantian problematic of rule-following and meaning, a novel argument against external world skepticism can be formulated. This argument takes the shape of a transcendental argument, which is reminiscent of Hilary Putnam’s infamous argument against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, but is, as is argued, superior to it in certain respects.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20201365