Aristotle on Substance as Primary in Time

Abstract In a notoriously obscure passage in Metaphysics 7.1 Aristotle claims that substance is primary in time. The only concrete literal interpretation suggested so far of this controversial claim is in terms of existing before and after in time. I argue that this interpretation faces serious prob...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sattler, Wolfgang (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2021
In: Phronesis
Year: 2021, Volume: 66, Issue: 3, Pages: 274-293
Further subjects:B primacy / priority
B Substance
B Time
B Metaphysics
B Aristotle
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Summary:Abstract In a notoriously obscure passage in Metaphysics 7.1 Aristotle claims that substance is primary in time. The only concrete literal interpretation suggested so far of this controversial claim is in terms of existing before and after in time. I argue that this interpretation faces serious problems. I then present a novel literal interpretation, in terms of being an appropriate subject of temporal predications, that is immune to these problems and strongly supported by philosophical and contextual considerations.
ISSN:1568-5284
Contains:Enthalten in: Phronesis
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/15685284-12341049