On the possible phenomenological autonomy of virtual realities
In the following article, I examine Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of dwelling with a view to its importance for the concept of ‘place’. It is my interest to show how a phenomenological concept of place can elucidate the phenomenology of virtual reality. I begin by contextualising the investigation t...
| Published in: | The Indo-Pacific journal of phenomenology |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Rhodes University
2020
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| In: |
The Indo-Pacific journal of phenomenology
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Malpas, Jeff 1958-
/ Virtual reality
/ Heidegger, Martin 1889-1976
/ Being
/ Place
/ Phenomenology
/ Autonomy
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism AF Geography of religion VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Phenomenology
B Heidegger B immersion B telepresence B Topology B Virtual Reality |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | In the following article, I examine Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of dwelling with a view to its importance for the concept of ‘place’. It is my interest to show how a phenomenological concept of place can elucidate the phenomenology of virtual reality. I begin by contextualising the investigation through a presentation of Jeff Malpas’ concept of the non-autonomy of the virtual, and argue for a clearer understanding of the notion of causal non-autonomy. Furthermore, I argue that the autonomy or lack thereof of virtual reality should not lead to the conclusion that virtual reality cannot be experienced and examined as a self-standing entity; that in order to properly understand virtual reality, we cannot limit ourselves to the reductionistic view presented by Malpas, but must account also for the phenomenology of experiencing virtuality - and under such a phenomenological consideration, the distinctions made between non-virtual and virtual reality are made more diffuse. I then argue that we can plausibly accept that places may exist in virtual reality, despite current technological and practical limitations. In addition, I go on to consider some possible metaphysical differences between virtual and non-virtual places. |
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| ISSN: | 1445-7377 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: The Indo-Pacific journal of phenomenology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/20797222.2020.1857945 |