Revisiting Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Argument in “Proof of an External World”
Abstract This paper argues that we should reject G. E. Moore’s anti-skeptical argument as it is presented in “Proof of an External World.” However, the reason I offer is different from traditional objections. A proper understanding of Moore’s “proof” requires paying attention to an important distinc...
| Veröffentlicht in: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Brill
2021
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2021, Band: 11, Heft: 4, Seiten: 289-311 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Moore, George Edward 1873-1958, Proof of an external world
/ Skeptizismus
/ Ablehnung
/ Argumentation
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus VA Philosophie |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Ontology
B Epistemology B G. E. Moore B Skepticism B Knowledge |
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| Zusammenfassung: | Abstract This paper argues that we should reject G. E. Moore’s anti-skeptical argument as it is presented in “Proof of an External World.” However, the reason I offer is different from traditional objections. A proper understanding of Moore’s “proof” requires paying attention to an important distinction between two forms of skepticism. I call these Ontological Skepticism and Epistemic Skepticism. The former is skepticism about the ontological status of fundamental reality, while the latter is skepticism about our empirical knowledge. Philosophers often assume that Moore’s response to “external world skepticism” deals exclusively with the former, not the latter. But this is a mistake. I shall argue that Moore’s anti-skeptical argument targets an ontological form of skepticism. Thus, the conclusion is an ontological claim about fundamental reality, while the premises are epistemic claims. If this is correct, then the conclusion outstrips the scope of its premises and proves too much. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10014 |