A Response to Martin Rhonheimer
In this response, I address Professor Rhonheimer’s charge that I deny the rational character of the natural law in my recent book. On the contrary, my theory of natural law is developed through an extended analysis of the ways in which reason draws on and informs the intelligibilities inherent in na...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Sage
2006
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| Dans: |
Studies in Christian ethics
Année: 2006, Volume: 19, Numéro: 3, Pages: 379-395 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Aquinas
B Natural Law B Moral universalism B Reason |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Édition parallèle: | Électronique
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| Résumé: | In this response, I address Professor Rhonheimer’s charge that I deny the rational character of the natural law in my recent book. On the contrary, my theory of natural law is developed through an extended analysis of the ways in which reason draws on and informs the intelligibilities inherent in nature, understood in diverse ways. In this response, I focus on two issues to which Professor Rhonheimer gives extended attention, the first interpretative, the second constructive—namely, first, Aquinas’s conception of reason, its scope and limits, and secondly, the prospects for moral universalism. |
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| ISSN: | 0953-9468 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Studies in Christian ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/0953946806071560 |