E. J. Lowe and Divine Causal Agency
In this essay, I apply Lowe’s theory of rational agency to God's causal activity. I argue that Lowe's account fits well the traditional notions that God acts in the world for reasons. In contrast to Lowe’s analysis of human causal agency, I argue that in the divine case, reasons for acting...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
2021
|
| Dans: |
TheoLogica
Année: 2021, Volume: 5, Numéro: 2, Pages: 161-177 |
| RelBib Classification: | KAJ Époque contemporaine NBC Dieu VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Agency
B Cause B Volition B Reasons B God |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | In this essay, I apply Lowe’s theory of rational agency to God's causal activity. I argue that Lowe's account fits well the traditional notions that God acts in the world for reasons. In contrast to Lowe’s analysis of human causal agency, I argue that in the divine case, reasons for acting are not constituted by needs. They are constituted by God's desires or plans. The fit between Lowe's account of causal agency and the contours of divine causal agency motivate an argument in favor of Lowe's theory. Any philosopher who is a theist ought to think Lowe's account is likely to be true. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2593-0265 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: TheoLogica
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.14428/thl.v5i2.58973 |
