On self-deception: from the perspective of Zhu Xi’s moral psychology
In order to construct a satisfactory theory of cheng-yi 誠意 (making thoughts sincere), Zhu Xi 朱熹 develops an account of how self-deception (zi-qi 自欺) is possible—a profound problem that has puzzled many philosophers. In Zhu’s opinion, zhi 知 (knowing) can be divided into two categories: a priori knowi...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Carfax
2021
|
In: |
Asian philosophy
Year: 2021, Volume: 31, Issue: 4, Pages: 414-429 |
Further subjects: | B
Moral Practice
B moral knowing B self-deception (zi-qi 自欺) B cheng-yi 誠意 (making thoughts sincere) B Zhu Xi 朱熹 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | In order to construct a satisfactory theory of cheng-yi 誠意 (making thoughts sincere), Zhu Xi 朱熹 develops an account of how self-deception (zi-qi 自欺) is possible—a profound problem that has puzzled many philosophers. In Zhu’s opinion, zhi 知 (knowing) can be divided into two categories: a priori knowing and empirical knowing. The further division of empirical knowing defines three sorts of self-deception: (1) the self-deception caused by one’s ignorance (wu-zhi 無知), (2) the self-deception caused by one’s superficial knowing (qian-zhi 淺知), and (3) the self-deception that may occur when one acquires genuine knowledge (zhen-zhi 真知). In this paper, I will construct a theoretical model of self-deception that follows Zhu’s criterial definition of self-deception in Daxue Zhangju 大學章句 (Interpretation of The Great Learning), thereby accounting for the possibility of these three sorts of self-deception. Better understanding of Zhu’s conception of self-deception could, moreover, open fruitful avenues for further work on his metaphysics and moral psychology. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1469-2961 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Asian philosophy
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1911384 |