The Starting-Points for Knowledge: Chrysippus on How to Acquire and Fortify Insecure Apprehension
This paper examines some neglected Chrysippean fragments on insecure apprehension (κατάληψις). First, I present Chrysippus’ account of how non-Sages can begin to fortify their insecure apprehension and upgrade it into knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Next, I reconstruct Chrysippus’ explanation of how sophisms...
| Published in: | Phronesis |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2022
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| In: |
Phronesis
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| Further subjects: | B
cognitive impression
B Stoic epistemology B Custom B criterion of truth B Academic skepticism B Assent |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | This paper examines some neglected Chrysippean fragments on insecure apprehension (κατάληψις). First, I present Chrysippus’ account of how non-Sages can begin to fortify their insecure apprehension and upgrade it into knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Next, I reconstruct Chrysippus’ explanation of how sophisms and counter-arguments lead one to abandon one’s insecure apprehension. One such counter-argument originates in the sceptical Academy and targets the Stoic claim that insecure apprehension can be acquired on the basis of custom (συνήθεια). I show how Chrysippus could defend the possibility of custom-based apprehension, while also denying that there is custom-based knowledge. |
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| ISSN: | 1568-5284 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Phronesis
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685284-bja10051 |