An epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness
It is often assumed that the first stage of many classical arguments for theism depends upon some version of the Principal of Sufficient Reason (PSR) being true. Unfortunately for classical theists, PSR is a controversial thesis that has come under rather severe criticism in the contemporary literat...
| Published in: | International journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2022
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Explanation
/ Ontology
/ Cognition theory
/ Principle
/ Sufficient reason
/ Theism
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VA Philosophy VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Epistemology
B Explanations B Brute facts B Classical Theism B The principle of sufficient reason |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | It is often assumed that the first stage of many classical arguments for theism depends upon some version of the Principal of Sufficient Reason (PSR) being true. Unfortunately for classical theists, PSR is a controversial thesis that has come under rather severe criticism in the contemporary literature. In this article, I grant for the sake of argument that every version of PSR is false. Thus, I concede with the critics of PSR, that it is possible that there is, at least, one fact that is ontologically brute. I then proffer an epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness. Specifically, I argue that whenever a knowledge seeker, S, perceives some unexplained fact, F, it is never reasonable for S to believe F is ontologically brute. I conclude that, even if PSR is false, it is more reasonable to believe that the key premise in the first stage of classical arguments for theism is true. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09805-y |