Why It Is Difficult To Defend the Plantinga-Type Ontological Argument
The Plantinga-type ontological argument may be tersely represented as follows: (1) If a maximally great being (MGB) is possible, then a MGB exists; (2) a MGB is possible; (3) therefore, a MGB exists. The key premise in this type of ontological argument is the possibility-premise, namely, that it is...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
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| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2022
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| In: |
Heythrop journal
Year: 2022, Volume: 63, Issue: 2, Pages: 196-209 |
| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism TK Recent history VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | The Plantinga-type ontological argument may be tersely represented as follows: (1) If a maximally great being (MGB) is possible, then a MGB exists; (2) a MGB is possible; (3) therefore, a MGB exists. The key premise in this type of ontological argument is the possibility-premise, namely, that it is possible that a MGB exists. But why affirm the possibility-premise? Proponents of the argument could claim that they have a strong modal intuition that the possibility-premise is true. Unfortunately, critics could likewise claim that they have a strong modal intuition that it is possible that a MGB does not exist or that it is possible that a semi-maximally great being exists, with these premises implying that a MGB does not exist. In this paper, I argue that, in light of this objection to the possibility-premise, the Plantinga-type ontological argument is difficult to defend. I then, however, offer a suggestion as to how one may argue for the existence of a MGB without defending the possibility-premise. |
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| ISSN: | 1468-2265 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Heythrop journal
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/heyj.13682 |